Main Article Content
In this essay I argue that in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein was perfectly coherent with his conception of philosophy and, accordingly, that no philosophical theory is to be found in the book. I apply this methodological principle to the so-called ‘ontological’ sections of the text and try to show that what Wittgenstein does is to give us the logic of ontological theories, which is not tantamount to putting forward an ontological theory. “Objects”, “facts” and so on are formal concepts, not empirical ones.
How to Cite
TOMASINI BASSOLS, Alejandro. On the Pseudo-Ontology of the Tractatus…. Annals of the University of Bucharest - Philosophy Series, [S.l.], v. 67, n. 2, p. 145-156, apr. 2019. ISSN 0068-3175. Available at: <http://annals.ub-filosofie.ro/index.php/annals/article/view/283>. Date accessed: 26 apr. 2019.