Main Article Content
In certain theories of philosophy of culture, the abstract aspect of values is emphasized, and, consequently, the values are treated as mere concepts. The formal kind in which they appear in any theoretical context is that of a value judgment. In this paper, I will develop the idea about a meaning of “negativity” implied in the structure of a value judgment. I intend, starting from Kant’s theory on the judgment of taste (about the beautiful), to point out a direction in which a critique of our prejudgments concerning the values is possible, along with a (philosophical) reconstruction of the culture. The meaning of negativity is present in the structure of any kind of value judgment, and its genesis is a non-judicative experience. All my arguments focus on this idea.
How to Cite
CERNICA, Viorel. Structural Negativity of Value Judgments. Annals of the University of Bucharest - Philosophy Series, [S.l.], v. 67, n. 2, p. 127-144, apr. 2019. ISSN 0068-3175. Available at: <http://annals.ub-filosofie.ro/index.php/annals/article/view/282>. Date accessed: 20 june 2019.