Reading Foucault as a Pragmatist. Critical Considerations on the Archaeological and Genealogical Methodology of a Foucauldian Pragmatism and on Its Normative Constitution

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyse and define a certain perspective on Foucault’s pragmatism, from a methodological perspective. The working hypothesis is that Foucault’s pragmatism is based on a methodological dualism, resulted from the synergy of archaeology and genealogy as two traditions of critical inquiry, that are applied to perform problematizations and resolutions of different facts of reality, in terms of “the history of the present”. As a practical research, this article will conclude with the possibilities of deriving both axiological and methodological principles of Foucault’s pragmatism as an autonomous philosophical project, proving its solid normative constitution also by accommodating archaeology and genealogy in order to develop specific operational categories of pragmatism as a critical inquiry, such as “problem”, “solution”, “diagnose”, “position”, “negation”.

Keywords: pragmatism, archaeology, genealogy, principle, history, practices, problematization, critical inquiry.

I. Introduction. Problematization through Reconstruction and Diagnosis. Claiming “Two Traditions of Critical Inquiry” for Foucault’s Pragmatism

My research is inspired by the most disputed work hypothesis among the exegetes who reconsidered the Foucauldian shift to a

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genealogical method, from an archaeological one, in the terms of “a historiographical expansion” (Koopman 2008, 338) of the French philosopher’s critical apparatus. This paper offers an alternative response to reducing this methodological reevaluation to a necessary improvement of his theoretical instruments adapted to the objective of creating an inquiry in the so-called “the history of the present”. This decisive technical commitment is often exposed as the result of a mutual compensation of the insufficiencies of each individual method to support a critical examination of the present time mapped as quotidian social situations, which need a proper problematization, followed by valid and applicable solutions.

Only by adding the historiographical elements necessary for genealogy could Foucault write histories that were relevant to and useful for a critique of the present situations in which he found himself. I argue here that an inquiry into the history of the present requires philosophical and political resources which are not yielded by an archaeology taken by itself but which can be generated on the basis of an expansion of historical inquiry so as to include genealogy alongside archaeology. (339)

It is my opinion that a possible explanation for the orientation of the archaeological perspective towards a genealogical one lies on the re-examination of the philosophical jargon, used in Koopman’s mentions and, implicitly, in Foucault’s writings, as part of a discourse belonging to a pragmatist theory. But, also from ‘a methodological precaution’, I will briefly explain my option for a certain understanding of pragmatism and its functional acceptances in the current analysis, as well as its intimate correlations with the senses of the genealogical and archaeological inquires, which inspired the main part of the objectives of this research and the related work-hypothesis.

In defining the pragmatism, I will adopt Koopman’s perspective from a more recent article, in which he attempts to demonstrate that pragmatism and genealogy ensure the critical inquiry of a problematization, performed in two phases: one of reconstruction, ensured by the pragmatism, and one of diagnosis, realized through genealogy. These “two traditions of critical inquiry”, as they are recognized by Koopman, are considered being symptomatic for Foucault’s philosophy, even though with some
precautions, they derived from saving him from being “a genealogist about everything” (Koopman 2011, 8), assumption that will be largely explained, at the right place, in further arguments of the article. According to Koopman:

Pragmatism is best seen as a forward-facing practice of philosophical critique that looks toward the responsive reconstruction of problematic situations in which we sometimes find ourselves – pragmatism teaches us to bring solutions whenever we bring problems, to focus on the meliorative attunement to difficulties at hand, and to furnish for ourselves possibilities of improvement on the basis of resources made available to us by the wider environments, in which we sometimes find ourselves blocked and bottlenecked. (6)

It is not my intention to assume pragmatism and genealogy as singular faces of a critical theory, nor to accept them as exclusive co-dependent constructs, since at this point, at least, it became clear that one of the objectives of my analysis is to attest the pragmatism in itself as such a theory, composed by two methodological paths, a genealogical, respectively, an archaeological one. Therefore, I will reserve my critique to Koopman’s argument to borrow the fundamental concepts that he dedicates to pragmatism, such as the evaluation of ‘problematic situations’ and their conditions of ‘possibility’, the available ‘resources’ for empiric and advantageous ‘solutions’, adding a supplementary particular note, whose demonstration represents one of the strikes of my analysis: the capacity to target the problematization and the resolution, as two main constitutive processes, in terms of “positions” and “negations” of their correspondent operational discourses at a social level. It will represent a secondary objective of my paper to justify that these discourses are based on two fundamental values, the truth and the false,

Another relevant observation is that the bibliographical apparatus of the current paper is composed by selecting exclusively Anglo-Saxon resources. This choice is tributary to the main objective of analysing the reception of Foucault’s works on pragmatism in its very genuine dimension, represented by the Anglo-Saxon thinking, mainly through the scientific contributions of W. James, C.S. Pierce, J. Dewey and R. Rorty. It is my intention to realize another paper dedicated to the French reception of the Foucauldian pragmatism, suggested in the works of J. Revel, Fr. Gros or G. Le Blanc.
and we shall see to what extent they are primary values, also operated by *pragmatism*, in a larger sense. In here, an argument from another work of Koopman is relevant, that I will also criticize, in the light of the previous considerations that make improbable or, at least, unsustainable, his substitution of “position and negation” with “truth and error”:

Deploying these methods together (genealogy and pragmatism) in this fashion leads to a conception of critical inquiry whose basic categories of critique are problem and response – as an alternative position and negation or truth and error. Critique, reconceived in this way, puts on the path to elaborating normativity in non-fundamental fashion. This would be a crucial philosophical achievement. (Koopman 2011, 558).

There is no doubt that a connection between pragmatism and genealogy might provoke a radical change of inheriting these philosophical traditions in a methodological symbiosis, but my goal is to keep the previous mentioned definition of pragmatism by disputing it into relation with a conceptual couple much more problematic and accommodated, the one between *archaeology* and *genealogy*.

Introducing the archaeology allows me to reorganize the two paths of a critical inquiry, namely *the reconstruction* and *the diagnosis* as correspondent tasks for the two methodological orientations, the archaeological, respectively the genealogical one, opening the field of interpretation to three major achievements: (1) the justification of pragmatism as a critical inquiry that responds to the definition elaborated above; (2) the possibility to prove that many of Foucault’s philosophical constructions are based on a *methodological dualism*, with a solid *normative* constitution; (3) the development of specific categories of pragmatism as critique inquiry, such as *the problem* and the *response*, that cannot be tracked as ‘truths’ and ‘errors’, as Koopman argued, but in terms of ‘positions’ and ‘negations’. The latter remark is also sustained by a Foucauldian perspective of different regimes of truths as results of

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3 Meaning Koopman’s definition completed by the supplementary characteristic that I introduced.
historical practices of entangling a corpus of knowledge and scientific discourses with certain techniques of power. I will test, at the opportune moment, the influence of this hypothesis on the attempt of reading Foucault as a pragmatist. In the end, it is Foucault’s confession from “The Concern for Truth”\(^4\) that *problematization* is the key of reading his entire philosophical work and therefore, this inquiry might provide not only a consistent reinterpretation of his “pragmatist” orientation, but also a redefinition, if not a radical reconstruction, of pragmatism, *in extenso*. In the following, I will evaluate different understandings of Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy from a methodological perspective, by confronting them with the conditions, exigencies and values of pragmatism, as it has been evoked.

II. “Theory as Practice”: A Sufficient Pragmatist Argument for Introducing the Methodological Distinction between Archaeology and Genealogy

Both the archaeological and genealogical method have in common – with the goals of the pragmatist construction – the act of *interpretation*, conceived by Foucault in the light of Nietzsche’s distinction between beginning and origin. On the one hand, any interpretation is a continuous process that stands for another one as an *interpretandum*. Therefore, any interpretation is a critique of its linguistic instruments, culture and time. Signs, for example, “prescribe the interpretation of their own interpretation” (Bondor 2005, 90) and their homogenous interaction, doubled by cultural significances, discourses and manipulations must be regarded as fabricated “truths” that hide the original interpretation that constitutes them. This is the main reason for which Foucault argues that the decisive element of the modern hermeneutics is the primacy of interpretation against signs. Even though an investigation of Foucault’s semiotic analysis is not a proper exercise

\(^4\) “The notion common to all the work that I have done (...) is that of problematization.” (Foucault 1984, 257).
in this place, this approach supports the understanding of a work-
thesis that conceiving **pragmatism as a practical philosophical
critique** based on **interpretation**. The so-called “techniques of interpretation”,
that Foucault addresses through his critique to Nietzsche, Marx and
Freud, might anticipate a persuasive pragmatist position, born from
“two suspicions” against the power of language to remain “loyal” to the
reality. Not only that “language does not say exactly what it means”,
and “authors” are required to “underneath the meaning”, but language
proves to be powerless in containing “many other things in the world
that speak.”\(^5\) As a consequence, pragmatism is forced to deal with the
apparent insufficiency of two main instruments: the primacy of truth
against knowledge and power, respectively, the insufficiency of language
to include in it viable structures that, despite their non-discursive
character, might count in developing a certain pragmatist ideology.

On the other hand, there is Nietzsche’s consideration that “all
things are subject to **interpretation**. Whichever interpretation prevails at a
given time is a function of power and not truth” (GM 145) inspires
Foucault’s argument to necessarily introduce the archaeological method
in contrast with the genealogical one: if the first one generally organizes
forms of knowledge in discursive orders of the past, relevant for the
history of the present, the last one performs the analysis of the same
contents, but in terms of true and false, contrasted by mechanisms of
power. At a first glimpse, it is not “truth” in itself which dictates the
methodological scission previously discussed, neither the object claimed
by each method that mostly influenced this rival paradigms in
approaching history, but the relationship between **knowledge** and **power**.

Generally, perspectives such as Flynn’s ones, also discussed by
Koopman, take advantage in the field of interpretations dedicated to the
Foucauldian methodology, by arguing that “the archaeological accent is

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\(^5\) According to Ormiston, “the identification of these two suspicions is, ostensibly,
the deployment of Foucault’s own interpretive technique. By associating the first
suspicion with the concept of **semainon** (semeion) Foucault juxtaposes the
fundamental concepts that found “anew the possibility of a hermeneutic” in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and then, again, in the nineteenth century
with Nietzsche, Freud and Marx.” (Ormiston 1990, 16)
on discourse, the genealogical on relations of power” (Flynn 2005, 24) and therefore, knowledge and power are subjected to the delimitation of archaeology from genealogy. In here, I agree with Koopman that:

One could very well write the archaeology of power on the model supplied by Foucault’s *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Foucault in fact had already undertaken exactly such a project, albeit in limited fashion, in attempting an archaeology of political economy in *The Order of Things*. As was there apparent, such an archaeology requires that power and knowledge be analysed as separate domains not directly related to one another, but only indirectly related by virtue of the underlying shared episteme in which both are articulated. (Koopman 2008, 341)

Hence, my attempt is to clarify if a certain acceptance of power provoked the Foucauldian switch from archaeology to genealogy, requiring specific means of interpretation. Secondary, I will try to emphasize that this methodological distinction is inspired by an epistemic level and that, on this assumptions, the understanding of “theory as practice” depends, as essence of the Foucauldian pragmatist perspective, focused on a principal concept - that of problematization – experienced through the methodological synergy of archaeology and genealogy.

**II.1. How Is it Possible to Reconstruct Foucault’s Pragmatism from Its Pretended Definition: “Theory as Practice”. Deriving the Principles of a Pragmatist Theory**

It might be considered that problematization represents, in Foucauldian acceptance, an examination of different historical phenomena, occurred in specific circumstances, regulated by social mechanisms that present them as relevant. This acceptance, very similar with that of a social critique, “objectifies what is objective” (Deacon 2000, 127): in other words, on this production of relevancy lies the connection between theory and practice and exactly this perspective will inspire Foucault’s critique in “redefining modernity as an ethos of permanent self-reinvention” (127), which is “genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method” (Rabinow 1984, 50).
This theoretical inquiry might destitute any attempt declared at the beginning of this research to achieve the contributions of the methodological significances of both the archaeology and genealogy to a Foucauldian pragmatism and for explaining its normative constitution. Therefore, it is my intention to argue that specifically this “self-reinvention” is the expression for Foucault’s primary principle of pragmatism, that I called “theory as a practice”.

Deacon presents genealogy as “a form of gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary erudition opposed to the search for origins”, by following Bouchard (1977, 139), and consequently, he accepts that genealogy is the only one that “problematises what is taken for granted; it introduces discontinuity into being itself” as “it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself” (Deacon 2000, 128). It would be the task of archaeology, consequently, to pursue the examination of discourses by their positivity, not by their validity in terms of “truth”.

By considering the practices, institutions, and theories of a particular socio-historical period to be on the same plane in terms of their “common traits,” “structures,” or “invariants,” archaeology is intended to permit the researcher to avoid “every problem concerned with the anteriority of theory to practice, and the inverse. (128)

As a consequence, from this perspective results a first principle for developing a pragmatist theory of Foucault, based on the methodological contrast between archaeology and genealogy, as it follows:

P1. The critical analysis of the conditions of possibility of a discourse in history does not depend on the anteriority of theory to practice.

As a matter of fact, in the light of the main pragmatist perspective attributed to Foucault announced at the beginning of this article, “theory as practice”, I will develop a corollary to the first principle:

C.P.1. Continuities and discontinuities of discourses must be analyzed not through the anteriority of theory to practice or inverse, but as intervals of confirming and infirming their social relevancy.
Secondly, the simple argument of “relevancy” requires a subject for whom operational judgments of historical corps of knowledge and apparatus of power are valuable. Even when modernity in itself is conceived as “an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them” (Foucault 1984, 50), it continues to look after a Subject, attentive to the historical production of objects of thought. “Critique” is inserted in here not yet as a problematization, but as a possibility to approach it through both archaeological and genealogical instruments. The first one procures its limits, while the second one imposes the exigencies of transgressing them. In the light of this perspective, a second principle of Foucault’s pragmatist theory might be derived, following its lecture on Kant’s modernity, as well as Deacon’s analysis on it:

P2. “The limits of knowledge” must be transformed into “a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression.”

Immediately, what results from this argument is exactly Foucault’s interest for defining the object of knowledge, the historical practices for creating, recognizing and analysing it, the practical manner in which it becomes integrated into a specific form of knowledge, and, implicitly, the ways in which by being criticized and transgressed, it will produce a new knowledge. This practical transformation of the object consists in its problematization. In here, a crucial explanation is required, that might also serve as a third principle of our intended reconstruction of Foucault’s pragmatism; valuable or not for the accomplishment of the objectives of the current research, this third principle is an authentic Foucauldian mention, that I believe it is persuasive in proving the hypothesis of a pragmatist project developed in the French philosopher’s writings:

6 In here, Deacon completes Foucault’s argument “in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?” (Foucault 1984, 45).
P3. “Problematization doesn’t mean representation of a pre-existing object, nor the creation by discourse of an object that doesn’t exist. It is the totality of discursive or non-discursive practices that introduces something into the play of true and false, and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis etc.).” (Foucault 1958, 257)

In order to sustain a pragmatist perspective, problematization operates the conciliation between discursive and non-discursive practices as an expression of the synergy between the archaeological and the genealogical conditions for the constitution of the object of thinking. Its forms (previously discussed as corps of knowledge in scientific, moral or political directions) confront once again the subject with what Deacon would call “a set of practices”. Hence, the object of thought and thought in itself must be pragmatic. A proper example for sustaining this assumption is reconsidering power as a productive and creative discourse of subjects that struggle in a relational interaction. Power is the Foucauldian pretext to analyse the manners in which individuals were made subjects in a history of different cultural models that performed their objectification. From the mode of “objectivizing of the speaking subject” (in a scientifically paradigm, such as a linguistic one) to the mode of performing “dividing practices” (by the subject himself or between subjects), Foucault suggests that:

Another way to go further toward a new economy of power relations, a way which is more empirical, more directly related to our present situation, and which implies more relations between theory and practice. It consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point. (Foucault 1983, 211)

The interaction between theory and practice represents, in fact, an equivalence: it is not enough to argue that effects of power are manifested on science, moral, institutions, culture, therefore on any structure whose discourses reflect “struggles against the privileges of knowledge”, it is necessary to explain how knowledge relates to power (regime du savoir) in order to constitute continuous or discontinuous answers to the question “Who are we?” In order to sum up this exemplification, Foucault’s consideration on the sense of pragmatist
solutions of power to quotidian, ordinary, immediate problems of today’s society is relevant:

To sum up, the main objective of these struggles is to attack not so much "such or such" an institution of power, or group, or elite, or class but rather a technique, a form of power. This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word "subject": subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to.⁷

In the archaeological acceptance, theory must act as a discourse of possibilities correspondent to immediate social, political or cultural struggles. Its content is focused on analysis, not on reconstruction: theory lacks an object, if by object one should understand “a representation of given facts”, as Deacon argues. A primary consequence of this perspective is what I announce in the formula of the fourth principle of the Foucauldian pragmatist apparatus, by appealing again to the author’s personal consideration, resumed in one of Deacon’s arguments:

P4. “Theory (forms of knowledge) and practice (relations of power) are not opposed, but so closely intertwined that”⁸ “theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice”⁹.

From “theory as practice”, considered the paradigm for which the reconstruction of the Foucauldian pragmatism is possible in this paper, the argument got to consider the equivalence between theory and practice. Hence, every time a theory is applied, which means that it produces different modifications of knowledge, creates *hic et nunc* its object. Theory cannot represent, since it is creative: the question raised,

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⁸ See Deacon 2000, 132.
⁹ See Foucault 1988, 207-208.
as a consequence, is why is representation excluded from the cohabitation of theory and practice in a Foucauldian pragmatism? A possible answer is offered by Deacon:

What Foucault calls problematization is a process of rendering or representing reality and theory as both part of this process and a product thereof, which produces and reproduces itself and the episteme or apparatus of which it forms a part. (Deacon 2000, 134)

It is well known that the Foucauldian episteme is operated in the archaeological practice in the relationship between discursive practices-knowledge-science. Whenever one considers writing the history of the present, it should conceive the possibilities of a discourse, as well as its regulatory practices: the episteme, in this sense, has to be re-presented, brought to the presence of a subject. If theory produces reality, then its contents must be tested both discursive and non-discursive, meaning both formal (through morals, scientific paradigms, values) and material (social, economic and political institutions, relations and interactions). In the light of theory as reality, problematization deals rather with the apparatus, than with the episteme. Hence:

P5. Problematization consists of the emergence between discursive and non-discursive.

But this assumption, raised as a principle, is still peculiar: it is not enough to distinguish material and ideal components of problematization, it is necessary to observe to what extent these two dimensions are correspondent or, at least, symptomatic, for a genealogical, respectively an archaeological constitution of problematization itself. At a first glimpse, interrogating, whether or not there is a genealogical concept of problematization, as well as a distinct, archaeological one, might be a sufficient process for understanding why theory and practice preserve the same active character and, more specifically, are produced at once. Until this point, I have argued that problematization is not solely a critical inquiry, based on the analysis of the conditions of possibility of a discourse, on its regularities (discursive formations), their social, cultural and political availability, the production of
an object of thought, as well as the balanced investigation of discursive and non-discursive practices. Genealogically, problematization, is reflected through the contrast of action and effects between thought and reality, the disruptions between theory and practice, the differences of discourse between subjects, as well as their behaviour.

Deacon concludes that

Problematization refers simultaneously to the historical process of producing an object for thought (the conditions of emergence), the specific discursive and non-discursive mechanisms involved in this production (the apparatus), and the manner in which human beings (particularly, but not exclusively intellectuals) find themselves engaged objectively, communicatively, and governmentally with both process and product (technologies of power, knowledge and the self).

(Deacon 2000, 139)

Hence, problematization means, in genealogical terms, the critique inquiry of the history of the presence through disruptions and successions of experiences, discourses, practices, institutions, while in archaeological terms, it questions their conditions of possibility. Nevertheless, all this principles, previously developed as normative contents operated in the reconstruction of a Foucauldian pragmatism, support the understanding of problematization, as well as its required resolution, in the light of archaeology and genealogy at a conceptual level. In order to accomplish a theory on its normative constitution from a methodological stance, I will come back to the primary strikes of this research, announced in the introduction of my paper. It is not enough to argue that problematization and resolution are two both necessary and implicitly processes of pragmatism: it is imperative to prove that the Foucauldian pragmatism is based on a methodological dualism, with a solid normative constitution, as well as on specific categories, such as the problem and the response, that cannot be tracked as “truths” and “errors”, as Koopman argued, but in terms of “positions” and “negations”.
II.2. The Methodological Dualism of Pragmatism: Archaeology vs. Genealogy. Going Back to Koopman’s Argument

Foucault’s commitment with genealogy should not be interpreted as a gesture of recognizing the insufficiencies of the archaeological method. The suspected ‘failure of archaeology’ comes mostly from a pre-judgment, that this method can exclusively perform, in Foucault’s methodological principles, the history of knowledge: facing the history of power, society needs a genealogical treatment, since power needs to be criticized in terms of multiplicity and relations of effects. I tend to consider that this distinction proves to be inconsistent in a pragmatist perspective: archaeology faces genealogy not in terms of compensating insufficiencies, but in terms of equilibrating accents. As Flynn argued, archaeology is focused primary on discourse, while genealogy is concentrated on power. Therefore, it is not sustainable to assume that archaeology and genealogy treat different objects: in the end, both archaeology and genealogy are applied to analyse the relationship between power and knowledge. Suspecting different epistemic levels that each method is focused on is not a solution either: in here, I share Koopman’s opinion that “what makes the shift necessary is the move from an analysis of an isolable domain of human activity to the analysis of the interaction between two or more non-isolable domains.” (Koopman 2008, 342) Genealogy requires the interaction, multiplicity and dynamics between power and knowledge, between discursive and non-discursive elements, between regularities identified and stressed through archaeology. If in the previous section the anteriority of theory to practice was suppressed, in explaining the methodological dualism of the Foucauldian pragmatism the same principle is applied not in terms of problematization, but in terms of diagnose. Discussing the normative constitution of this critical inquiry, a first methodological principle becomes:

M1. To diagnose the history is to realize an operable differentiation of present from past.

The principle has two corollaries:
C.M.1. The task of philosophy is to diagnose the history of the present.\(^\text{10}\)
C.M.2. Diagnose leads to action and this is what makes history criticizable.\(^\text{11}\)

Secondly, in my opinion, this critical inquiry operates a methodological dualism, because the synergy between archaeology and genealogy is based on combining specific elements for each one, leading to the study of the history of the present. If archaeology allows a temporal unity one step at the time – focusing on analysing the episteme as instrument of defining the conditions of possibility for knowledge representative for a cultural period, genealogy extends the temporal perspective as multiplicity, following what might be called, with higher precautions, the dynamics of these episteme. As a consequence, “adding genealogy to archaeology”, as Koopman says, does not represent a methodological shift from discontinuity to multiplicity in the order of time, but the possibility to simultaneously approach the history of the present both as temporal integrity and as temporal multiplicity. This aspect leads to the second normative methodological principle:

M2. The method applied to realize a critical inquiry of the history of the present must satisfy at a micro-level the temporal integrity of an episteme, and, at a macro-level its historical transgression.

Implicitly,

C.M.2. The archaeological method allows a conceptualization of temporal integrity which engages temporal discontinuity.
C.M.2. The genealogical method allows a conceptualization of temporal multiplicity.
C.M.2 The methodological dualism of pragmatism must deal both with temporal discontinuity and multiplicity.

\(^{10}\) "To diagnose the present is to say what the present is, and how our present is absolutely different from all that is not it, that is to say, from our past. Perhaps this is the task for philosophy now.” (Foucault 1989, 53)

\(^{11}\) “What I wanted to write was a history book that would make the present situation comprehensible and, possibly, lead to action. If you like, I tried to write a ‘treatise of intelligibility’ about the penitentiary situation, I wanted to make it intelligible and, therefore, criticizable.” (Foucault 1988, 101)
Once the applicability of the methodological dualism in temporal conditions is clarified, it is necessary to clarify the limits of its approached domains. The explanation lies on the capacity of archaeology to lie on a proper domain, paradigmatically\textsuperscript{12} constituted, while genealogy addresses to multiple domains in their interaction. This is why I consider that Koopman’s interpretation of genealogy as an extended archaeology should be regarded in methodological acceptances and connected to the main concept of this pragmatist construction, “problematization”. Consequently,

M3. Methodologically, problematization must be performed transversally.
C.M.3.1. As transversal approach of domains, problematization lies on the dynamics of different apparatus and on the intersection between power and knowledge as a critical inquiry.
C.M.3.2. The archaeological model of the constitution of episteme is combined with the genealogical model of the power-knowledge relationship.
C.M.3.3. If the archaeological model operates mainly descriptive, the genealogical model functions on the production of explanations.
C.M.3.4. The methodological dualism of pragmatism consists of operating simultaneously a descriptive and an explanatory component.

Beside the methodological tensions and emergences between archaeology and genealogy, the justification of a normative constitution of pragmatism should not neglect the critique of specific categories operated within. On the one hand, the problem and the response, the diagnose and the resolution were presented, among this paper, as symptomatically categories of the Foucauldian pragmatism: they are relationally and simultaneously applied to reality, to the immediate society, to the individual and its subjected political condition. In the analysis of facts, problematization and resolution cannot be tracked as “truths” and “errors”, as Koopman argued. This mention was

\textsuperscript{12} Even it is not the place of this argument in the current paper, it is welcomed the mention that Foucault’s episteme is very similar with Kuhn’s paradigm. They both work as exemplary models of scientific knowledge, and are considered reactions to an epochal change, but the differences between them are represented mostly by the flexibility of paradigms to be constituted by not very rigorous rules of formation. To be consulted Merquior 1985, 36-38.
recognized as one of the main problematic aspects to which this personal analysis is devoted, since that I intend to solve based on the following argument. On the one hand, if we accept the methodological dualism of pragmatism, then we are obliged to understand, in the line of the archaeological line that “truth” and “false” are values attributed to different sentences incorporated in the constitution of an episteme. “Truth” in itself becomes a value whose status can be discusses isolated of the conditions of possibility of a discourse, mainly of an episteme. This type of opposition between “truth” and “errors” is operable only at one level - that of what Foucault names, in the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, being “an epistemological history of science”.

Consequently, this description takes as its norm the fully constituted science: the history that it recounts is necessarily concerned with the opposition of truth and error, the rational and irrational, the obstacle and fecundity, purity and impurity, the scientific and the non-scientific. It is an epistemological history of sciences. (Foucault 1972, 210)

Moreover, this ‘epistemologization’ becomes secondary in the construction of a pragmatist position: “at this level, scientificity does not serve as a norm.” (210)

Addressing a problem means “positioning” a discourse and “negating” it by applying a solution that implicitly destroys the problem itself. As a critical inquiry of real facts, based on theory as practice, pragmatism should consider its two main categories, “problematization” and “resolution” not as “truths” and “errors”, but as two elements whose definition correspond both to the archaeological exigencies, as well as to the genealogical ones. “Positions” and “negations” are more proper for an analysis of facts. Another explanation for privileging these two notions as equivalent terms for the categories operated by this pragmatist apparatus is connected to the observation that “problematization” and “resolution” require a certain acceptance of “present”. Pragmatism should be considered as devoted to the history of the practices of the present, committed with a very specific “normativity”. Hence, archaeology and genealogy engage in the construction of pragmatism the distinction between “present” and “historical present”. As Koopman said:
While our actual present is conditioned by certain forms of power and certain forms of knowledge, our historical present is conditioned by the temporalized interactions between these powers and knowledges. (Koopman 2008, 353)

In these terms, “positions” and “negations” mean also fixing and annulling normative limits of specific domains of analysis, discursive and nondiscursive constructs that allow to judge knowledge and power not only in themselves, but also in connection. These two acceptances of present, indicated by Koopman, makes Foucault’s pragmatism feasible, coherent and complete.

III. Instead of Conclusions

Recasting the synergy between archaeology and genealogy has allowed me to operate, in this paper, a reconstruction of Foucault’s pragmatism, from a normative perspective. Facing Foucault’s pragmatism as a practice of a critical inquiry, principled both on an ideological and methodological level, might open a different reception of his writings, as practical commitment to reality as history in its transitions. Even though many conceptual directions were intentionally neglected in my analysis, such as the analysis of Foucault’s positioning in front of “a particular tradition of ideology critique” (Kumar 2005, 62), the details of his observations on the historical conditioning of moral codes, human consciousness, social and political practices of control, domination, resistance and power, the connection between regimes of truth and effects of power, the main perspective on freedom, or even more technical observations regarding the constitution of archaeology and genealogy as methodologies, I strongly believe that my analysis has an original contribution not only on defining and recognizing a Foucauldian pragmatism, but also on explaining its normative structure.

Reading Foucault as a pragmatist, in order to discover in his writings enough arguments to evoke him as such, without reducing this lecture to the classical polemic debates on problematization – that confronts Foucault with Habermas and Rorty as deliberate pragmatists, narrowing the discussion to an exclusive thematic field, such as the
political one - represents an hermeneutical effort to consolidate a critical and normative apparatus of pragmatism that must count for itself. I think that precisely this demonstration is necessary to continue the investigation of a coherent dialogue between Foucault’s thinking and any convinced pragmatist: at least now, any argument can be related to his relevancy or cohesion with a normative constitution of the Foucauldian pragmatist perspective. Moreover, arguing that Foucauldian pragmatism is based on the cohabitation of the archaeological and genealogical method represents an attempt to overcome interpretations such as Koopman’s analysis, tributary to the acceptance of a genealogical pragmatism of Foucault’s critical inquiries. Even methodologically, it is a responsible gesture to check not only the availability of a genealogical pragmatism or an “archaeological one”: the challenge is to think their synergy in a coherent and complete philosophical project, with an autonomous methodological construction and normative constitution, whose consequences might even reshape the inheritance of Foucault’s structuralism.

REFERENCES


